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Abstract
In this paper, a new wiretap channel model is proposed, where the legitimate transmitter and receiver
communicate over a discrete memoryless channel. The wiretapper has perfect access to a fixed-length
subset of the transmitted codeword symbols of her choosing. Additionally, she observes the remainder of
the transmitted symbols through a discrete memoryless channel. This new model subsumes the classical
wiretap channel and wiretap channel II with noisy main channel as its special cases. The strong secrecy
capacity of the proposed channel model is identified. Achievability is established by solving a dual
secret key agreement problem in the source model, and converting the solution to the original channel
model using probability distribution approximation arguments. In the dual problem, a source encoder and
decoder, who observe random sequences independent and identically distributed according to the input
and output distributions of the legitimate channel in the original problem, communicate a confidential
key over a public error-free channel using a single forward transmission, in the presence of a compound
wiretapping source who has perfect access to the public discussion. The security of the key is guaranteed
for the exponentially many possibilities of the subset chosen at wiretapper by deriving a lemma which
provides a doubly-exponential convergence rate for the probability that, for a fixed choice of the subset,
the key is uniform and independent from the public discussion and the wiretapping source’s observation.
The converse is derived by using Sanov’s theorem to upper bound the secrecy capacity of the new wiretap
channel model by the secrecy capacity when the tapped subset is randomly chosen by nature.
This paper was presented in part at the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. This work was supported
by NSF Grants CCF 13-19338 and CNS 13-14719.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner’s wiretap channel models a legitimate transmitter and a receiver communicating over a
discrete memoryless channel (DMC), referred to as the main channel, in the presence of a passive
wiretapper who only listens to the transmitted signal through a cascaded second DMC, referred
to as the wiretapper channel [1]. Subsequently, reference [2] has generalized Wyner’s wiretap
channel model to a general, not necessarily degraded, discrete memoryless wiretap channel.
Later, Ozarow and Wyner, in reference [3], have introduced the wiretap channel II model, which
considers a noiseless main channel and a binary erasure channel to the wiretapper, where the
wiretapper is able to select the positions of erasures. Interestingly, using random partitioning and
combinatorial arguments, reference [3] has showed that the secrecy capacity for this channel is
equal to that if the wiretapper is a passive observer unable to choose the positions of the erasures,
thus demonstrating the ability of coding to neutralize this more powerful wiretapper.
While considerable research on code design for secure communication followed the random-
ized coset coding of [3], see for example [4]–[6], the idea of the wiretap channel II remained
linked to the assumption of a noiseless main channel for several decades, mainly due to technical
challenges in generalizing the model outside of this special model. Yet, the notion of providing
the wiretapper with this additional capability of choosing what to observe is appealing and
represents a positive step towards providing confidentiality guarantees in stronger attack models.
Towards this end, reference [7] introduced a discrete memoryless (noisy) main channel to the
wiretap channel II model, and derived outer and inner bounds for the capacity-equivocation
region of the model, where the proposed achievability scheme is optimal for the special case of
the maximizing input distribution being uniform. More recently, reference [8] found the secrecy
capacity of this model, showing that, once again, the secrecy capacity is equal to that of the
case when the wiretapper channel is replaced with a discrete memoryless erasure channel.
This work goes one step further and introduces a new wiretap channel model with a discrete
memoryless main channel and a wiretapper who observes a subset of the transmitted codeword
symbols of her choosing perfectly, as well as observing the remaining symbols through a second
DMC. This general model includes as special cases both the classical wiretap channel in [2] by
setting the subset size to zero, and the wiretap channel II with a noisy main channel in [7] by
setting the wiretapper’s DMC to an erasure channel with erasure probability one. We characterize
3the strong secrecy capacity for the proposed wiretap channel model, quantifying precisely the
cost in secrecy capacity due to the additional capability at the wiretapper, with respect to the
previous wiretap models.
We first present the achievability. Recent independent work [8] has provided an achievability
proof for the channel model considered in [7] using a stronger version of Wyner’s soft covering
lemma [9]. Extending the achievability proof in [8] to the new wiretap channel model is challeng-
ing due to the additional noisy observations at the wiretapper, since the aforementioned lemma
entails approximating the distribution of the wiretapper channel output with an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) n-letter distribution. Instead, we establish the achievability by a
framework similar to the output statistics of random binning framework in [10]. In particular,
we solve a dual secret key agreement problem in the source model sense [11], [12], and infer
the design for the encoder and decoder of the original channel model from the solution of
the dual problem. The difference between our achievability proof and the framework presented
in [10] is that we measure the statistical dependence between the transmitted message and
the wiretapper’s observation in terms of the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence instead of total
variation distance, which requires establishing a convergence result, with a rate strictly faster than
1
n
, for the probability that the two induced distributions from the original and the dual models
are close in the total variation distance sense. In addition, in the source model, we guarantee the
secrecy of the confidential key for the exponentially many possibilities of the subset chosen at the
wiretapper by deriving a one-shot result which provides a doubly-exponential convergence rate
for the probability that the key is uniform and independent from the wiretapper’s observation.
To summarize, the main advantage of working with the appropriate dual source coding problem
is that it renders the analysis of the scenario at hand tractable.
The converse is derived by identifying a channel model whose secrecy capacity is identical to
that of the proposed channel model, and is easier to establish the converse of. This is done by
means of upper bounding its secrecy capacity with that of a discrete memoryless channel whose
secrecy capacity is tractable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the new wiretap
channel model. Section III provides the main result of the paper, i.e., the strong secrecy capacity
for the new wiretap channel. Sections IV and V provide the achievability and converse proofs.
4Section VII concludes the paper. The proofs for the supporting lemmas are provided in the
Appendices.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We first remark the notation we use throughout the paper. Vectors are denoted by bold lower-
case super-scripted letters while their components are denoted by lower-case sub-scripted letters.
A similar convention but with upper-case letters is used for random vectors and their components.
Vector superscripts are omitted when dimensions are clear from the context. We use 1{A} to
denote the indicator function of the event A. For a, b ∈ R, Ja, bK denotes the set of integers
{i ∈ N : a ≤ i ≤ b}. For S ⊆ N, XS denotes the sequence {Xi}i∈S . We use upper-case letters
to denote random probability distributions, e.g., PX , and lower-case letters to denote deterministic
probability distributions, e.g., pX . We use pUX to denote a uniform distribution over the random
variable X . The argument of the probability distribution is omitted when it is clear from its
subscript. V(pX , qX) and D(pX ||qX) denote the total variation distance and the Kullback-Leibler
(K-L) divergence between the probability distributions pX and qX .
We consider the channel model illustrated in Figure 1. The main channel
{
X,Y, pY |X
}
is a
discrete memoryless channel (DMC) which consists of a finite input alphabet X, a finite output
alphabet Y, and a transition probability pY |X . The transmitter wishes to transmit a message
M , uniformly distributed over M = J1, 2nRsK, to the legitimate receiver reliably, and to keep
the message secret from the wiretapper. To do so, the transmitter maps the message M to
the transmitted codeword Xn ∈ Xn using a stochastic encoder. The legitimate receiver observes
Yn ∈ Yn and maps its observation to the estimate Mˆ of the message M . The wiretapper chooses
a subset S ∈ S where the set S is defined as
S =
{
S : S ⊆ J1, nK, |S| = µ ≤ n, α =
µ
n
}
. (1)
Then, the wiretapper observes the sequence ZnS = [ZS1 , ZS2 , · · · , ZSn ] ∈ Zn, with
ZSi =


Xi, i ∈ S
Vi, otherwise,
(2)
where Vn = [V1, V2, · · · , Vn] ∈ Vn is the output of the DMC pV |X when Xn is the input, and
5Fig. 1: A new wiretap channel model.
the alphabet Z is given by Z = {X ∪ V}.
An (n, 2nRs) code Cn for the channel model in Figure 1 consists of
(i) the message set M = J1, 2nRsK,
(ii) the stochastic encoder PXn|M,Cn at the transmitter, and
(iii) the decoder at legitimate receiver.
We consider the strong secrecy constraint at the wiretapper [13], [14]. Rate Rs is an achievable
strong secrecy rate if there exists a sequence of (n, 2nRs) channel codes, {Cn}n≥1, such that
lim
n→∞
P
(
Mˆ 6= M |Cn
)
= 0 Reliability, (3)
and lim
n→∞
max
S∈S
I (M ;ZnS|Cn) = 0 Strong Secrecy, (4)
where S is defined as in (1). The strong secrecy capacity, Cs, is the supremum of all achievable
strong secrecy rates.
Finally, we will be using the following two measures extensively in the sequel. The total vari-
ation distance between two probability distributions pX and qX , defined on the same probability
space, is given by
V(pX , qX) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|p(x)− q(x)| =
∑
x∈X: p(x)>q(x)
[p(x)− q(x)]. (5)
The Kullback-Leibler divergence, or relative entropy, between the two distributions pX and qX ,
defined on the same probability space, is given by
D(pX ||qX) =
∑
x∈X
pX(x) log
pX(x)
qX(x)
. (6)
6III. MAIN RESULT
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the strong secrecy capacity of the new wiretap channel model in
Figure 1 is given by
Cs(α) = max
U−X−Y V
[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;V )− αI(U ;X|V )]+ , (7)
where the maximization is over all the distributions pUX which satisfy the Markov chain U −
X − Y V , and the cardinality of U can be restricted as |U| ≤ |X|.
Proof: The achievability and converse proofs for Theorem 1 are provided in Sections IV and
V, respectively. 
Remark 1 An equivalent characterization for the strong secrecy capacity of the new wiretap
channel model is given by
Cs(α) = max
U−X−Y V
[I(U ; Y )− αI(U ;X)− (1− α)I(U ;V )]+ , (8)
since I(U ;X|V ) in (7) can be written as
I(U ;X|V ) = H(U |V )−H(U |X) (9)
= H(U)− I(U ;V )−H(U |X) = I(U ;X)− I(U ;V ), (10)
where (9) follows from the Markov chain U −X − V .
Corollary 1 By setting the tapped subset by the wiretapper, S, to the null set, or equivalently
α = 0, the secrecy capacity in (7) is equal to the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless
wiretap channel in [2, Corollary 2], i.e.,
Cs(0) = max
U−X−Y V
[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;V )]+ . (11)
Remark 2 Comparing (7) and (11), we observe that the secrecy cost, with respect to the classical
wiretap channel, of the additional capability of the wiretapper to choose a subset of size αn of
the codewords to access perfectly, is equal to αI(U ;X|V ).
7Corollary 2 By setting the wiretapper’s DMC through which she observes the (1−α)n symbols
she does not choose, pV |X , to be an erasure channel with erasure probability one, the secrecy
capacity in (7) is equal to the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel II with a noisy main
channel in [8, Theorem 2], i.e.,
Cs(α) = max
U−X−Y
[I(U ; Y )− αI(U ;X)]+ . (12)
Remark 3 Comparing (8) and (12), the secrecy cost, with respect to the wiretap channel II with
a noisy main channel, of the additional capability of the wiretapper of observing (1−α) fraction
of the codeword through the DMC pV |X , is equal to (1− α)I(U ;V ).
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
We establish the achievability for Theorem 1 using an indirect approach as in [10], [15], [16].
We define a dual secret key agreement problem in the source model which introduces a set of
random variables similar to the set of variables introduced by the original problem. The alphabets
of the random variables in the original and dual problems are identical. A subset of the random
variables in the dual problem are considered to have distributions identical to the distributions of
the corresponding variables in the original problem. Yet, the distribution of the random variables
can differ from those of the original problem due to the different dynamics in the original and
dual problems. The main trick is to search for conditions such that the joint distributions of the
random variables in the two problems are almost identical in the total variation distance sense.
This enables converting the solution, i.e., finding an encoder and decoder which satisfy certain
reliability and secrecy conditions, for the dual problem, which is more tractable, to a solution of
the original problem. Duality here is an operational duality [17] in which the solution for the
dual problem is converted to a solution for the original problem.
We first prove the achievability for the case U = X . We fix the input distribution pX and
define two protocols; each of these protocols introduces a set of random variables and random
vectors and induces a joint distribution over them. The first protocol, protocol A, describes a dual
secret key agreement problem in which a source encoder and decoder observe random sequences
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to the input and output distributions of
the original channel model. The source encoder and decoder intend to communicate a confidential
8key via transmitting a public message over an error-free channel, in the presence of a compound
wiretapping source who has perfect access to the public message and observes another random
sequence whose distribution belongs to a finite class of distributions, with no prior distribution
over the class. The second protocol, protocol B, describes the original channel model in Figure
1, with the addition of assuming a common randomness that is available at all terminals.
We first derive rate conditions for protocol A such that its induced distribution is close in
the total variation distance sense to the induced distribution from protocol B. Then, we derive
rate conditions for protocol A such that (i) the communication of the key is reliable, and that
(ii) the probability of the key being uniform and independent from the public message and the
wiretapping source observation converges doubly exponentially to one with the block-length.
Next, we use the closeness of the two induced distributions from the two protocols to show
that, under the same rate conditions for protocol B, properties (i) and (ii) hold for protocol B as
well. Finally, we eliminate the assumed common randomness from protocol B by conditioning
on a certain instance of the common randomness. Property (ii) for protocol B after removing the
common randomness results in an achievable strong secrecy rate for the original channel model.
In the following, we describe the two protocols in detail.
Protocol A (Secret key agreement in source model): The protocol is illustrated in Figure 2.
The random vectors Xn,Yn are i.i.d. according to pXY = pXpY |X , where pY |X is the transition
probability of the main channel in Figure 1. The source encoder observes the sequence Xn and
randomly assigns (bins) it into the two bin indices M = B1,n(Xn) and C = B2,n(Xn), where
B1,n and B2,n are uniformly distributed over J1, 2nRsK and J1, 2nR˜sK, respectively. That is, each
xn ∈ Xn is randomly and independently assigned to the indices m ∈ J1, 2nRsK and c ∈ J1, 2nR˜sK.
The bin index C represents the public message which is transmitted over a noiseless channel to
the decoder and perfectly accessed by the wiretapper. The bin index M represents the confidential
key to be generated at the encoder and reconstructed at the decoder. The source decoder observes
C and the i.i.d. sequence Yn, and outputs the estimate Xˆn of Xn, which in turn generates the
estimate Mˆ of M . For any S ∈ S, where S is defined as in (1), the wiretapper source node
observes C and the sequence ZnS in (2). The subset S is selected by the wiretapper and her
selection is unknown to the legitimate parties. Thus, the wiretapper can be represented as a
compound source ZnS ,
{
Z, pZn
S
, S ∈ S
}
whose distribution is only known to belong to the
9Fig. 2: Protocol A: Secret key agreement in the source model.
finite class {pZn
S
}S∈S with no prior distribution over the class, with |S| =
(
n
αn
)
≤ 2n. For S ∈ S,
the induced joint distribution for this protocol is
P˜MCXYZSXˆ(m, c,x,y, z, xˆ) = pXYZS(x,y, z)P˜MC|X(m, c|x)P˜Xˆ|YC(xˆ|y, c) (13)
= pXYZS(x,y, z)1{B1,n(X) = M}1{B2,n(X) = C}P˜Xˆ|YC(xˆ|y, c) (14)
= P˜MC(m, c)P˜X|MC(x|m, c) pYZS |X(y, z|x)P˜Xˆ|YC(xˆ|y, c). (15)
Protocol B (Main problem assisted with common randomness): This protocol is defined as the
channel model in Figure 1, with an addition of a common randomness C that is uniform over
J1, 2nR˜sK, independent from all other variables, and known at all terminals. In fact, the assumed
common randomness represents the random nature in generating the codebook, which is known
at all nodes. At the end of the proof, we eliminate the assumed common randomness from the
channel model in this protocol by conditioning on a certain instance of it. The encoder and
decoder in this protocol are defined as in (15), i.e., PX|MC = P˜X|MC and PXˆ|YC = P˜Xˆ|YC . The
induced joint distribution for this protocol is given by
PMCXYZSXˆ(m, c,x,y, z, xˆ) = p
U
Mp
U
CP˜X|MC(x|m, c) pYZS |X(y, z|x)P˜Xˆ|YC(xˆ|y, c). (16)
The induced joint distributions in (15) and (16) are random due to the random binning of Xn.
Note that we have ignored the random variables Mˆ from the induced joint distributions at this
stage. We will introduce them later to the joint distributions as deterministic functions of the
random vectors Xˆn, after fixing the binning functions.
The remaining steps of the proof are outlined as follows:
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(i) We derive a condition on the rates Rs and R˜s such that the two induced joint distributions
(15) and (16) are close in the total variation distance sense, when averaged over the random
binning.
(ii) We then use Slepian-Wolf source coding theorem [18], [19] to derive a condition on the
rate R˜s such that the decoding of Xˆ in protocol A is reliable.
(iii) Next, for protocol A, we derive another condition on the rates Rs and R˜s such that the
probability, with respect to the random binning, that for any S ∈ S, the messages M and
C are uniform and independent from the wiretapper’s observation ZnS , goes to one as n
goes to infinity, i.e., protocol A is secure.
(iv) We use the closeness of the two induced distributions for the two protocols to show that
the aforementioned reliability and secrecy properties hold for protocol B as well.
(v) Finally, we eliminate the common randomness C from the channel model in protocol B
by showing that the reliability and secrecy constraints still hold when we condition on a
certain instance of C, i.e., C = c∗.
Note that, for the secrecy constraint, we have required the independence of the assumed
common random C from both M and ZnS so that when we condition over an instance of C,
the independence of M and ZnS is not affected. Before continuing with the proof, we state the
following lemmas.
A. Useful Lemmas
Lemma 1 is a one-shot result, which provides an exponential decay rate for the average, over
the random binning, of the total variation distance between the two induced distributions from
the two protocols. We utilize this lemma to show a convergence in probability result that allows
converting the secrecy property from protocol A to protocol B. A result similar to Lemma 1
was derived in [10, Appendix A] which does not provide the required convergence rate, hence
the need for Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Let the source X , {X, pX} be randomly binned into M = B1(X) and C = B2(X),
where B1 and B2 are uniform over J1, M˜K and J1, C˜K, respectively. Let B , {B1(x),B2(x)}x∈X,
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and for γ > 0, define
Dγ ,
{
x ∈ X : log
1
pX(x)
> γ
}
. (17)
Then, we have
EB
(
V
(
PMC , p
U
Mp
U
C
))
≤ P (X /∈ Dγ) +
1
2
√
M˜C˜2−γ, (18)
where P is the induced distribution over M and C.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
Lemma 2 below is again a one-shot result which provides a doubly-exponential decay rate for
the probability of failure of achieving the secrecy property for protocol A, for a fixed choice of
the subset S. This lemma is needed, along with the union bound, to guarantee secrecy against
the exponentially many possibilities of the tapped subset S.
Lemma 2 Let X , {X, pX} and {ZS} , {Z, pZS , S ∈ S} be two correlated sources with
|X|, |Z|, and |S| < ∞, where {ZS}S∈S is a compound source whose distribution is known to
belong to the finite class {pZS}S∈S. Let X be randomly binned into the bin indices M and C
as in Lemma 1. For γ > 0 and any S ∈ S, define
DSγ ,
{
(x, z) ∈ X× Z : log
1
pX|ZS(x|z)
> γ
}
. (19)
If there exists δ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
such that for all S ∈ S, PpXZS
(
(X,ZS) ∈ D
S
γ
)
≥ 1 − δ2, then, we
have, for every ǫ1 ∈ [0, 1], that
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
≥ ǫ˜
)
≤ |S||Z| exp
(
−ǫ21(1− δ)2
γ
3M˜C˜
)
, (20)
where ǫ˜ = ǫ1 + (δ + δ2) log(M˜C˜) + Hb(δ2), Hb is the binary entropy function, and P is the
induced distribution over M,C, and ZS .
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B. 
The selection lemma below is used to show the existence of a binning realization such that
both the secrecy and reliability properties hold for protocol B. It is also used to eliminate the
common randomness C from the channel model in protocol B.
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Lemma 3 (Selection Lemma) [20, Lemma 2.2]:
Let A1, A2, · · · , An be a sequence of random variables where An ∈ An, and let Fn = {f1,n, · · · , fM,n}
be a finite set of bounded functions fi,n : An 7→ R+, i ∈ J1,MK, such that |Fn| = M does not
depend on n, and
lim
n→∞
EAn (fi,n(An)) = 0 for all i ∈ J1,MK. (21)
Then, there exists a specific realization {a∗n} of the sequence {An} such that
lim
n→∞
fi,n(a
∗
n) = 0 for all i ∈ J1,MK. (22)
The following Lemma states two properties of the total variation distance, which we utilize
through the achievability proof.
Lemma 4 (Properties of Total Variation Distance) [16, Lemmas V.1 and V.2]:
Consider the joint distributions pX,Y = pXpY |X and qX,Y = qXqY |X , defined on the same
probability space. Then, we have,
V(pX , qX) ≤ V(pX,Y , qX,Y ) (23)
V(pXpY |X , qXpY |X) = V(pX , qX). (24)
In order to apply Lemmas 1 and 2 to protocol A, we use Hoeffding’s inequality, which is
stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 (Hoeffding’s Inequality) [21, Theorem 2]:
Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be independent random variables with Xi ∈ [0, b] for all i ∈ J1, nK, and let
m¯ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 E(Xi). Then, for ǫ > 0, we have
P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1− ǫ)m¯
)
≤ exp
(
−2ǫ2m¯2
b2
n
)
. (25)
B. Proof
First, we apply Lemma 1 to protocol A. In Lemma 1, set X = Xn, M˜ = 2nRs , C˜ = 2nR˜s ,
B = Bn = {B1,n(x),B2,n(x)}x∈Xn , and γ = n(1 − ǫ2)H(X), where ǫ2 > 0 and Xn is defined
as in protocol A, i.e., is an i.i.d. sequence. Without loss of generality, we assume that for all
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x ∈ X, we have pX(x) > 0. Let pmin = minx∈X pX(x), where the minimum exists since the
input alphabet X is finite1. Thus, the random variables log 1
pX(Xi)
, i ∈ J1, nK, are i.i.d. and each
is bounded by the interval [0, bmax], where bmax = log 1pmin .
We also have that m¯ = 1
n
∑n
i=1EpX
(
log 1
pX(Xi)
)
= H(X). Using Hoeffding’s inequality in
(25), we have, for any ǫ2 > 0, that
P (X /∈ Dγ) = PpX
(
log
1
pX(X)
≤ γ
)
(26)
= PpX
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
1
pX(Xi)
≤ (1− ǫ2)H(X)
)
(27)
≤ exp
(
−2ǫ22H(X)
2
b2max
n
)
= exp(−β1n), (28)
where β1 = 2ǫ
2
2H(X)
2
b2max
> 0.
By substituting the choices for M˜, C˜, γ and (28) in (18), we have, as long as Rs + R˜s <
(1− ǫ2)H(X), that
EBn
(
V(P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C)
)
≤ 2 exp(−βn), (29)
where β2 = ln 22
(
(1− ǫ2)H(X)− Rs − R˜S
)
and β = min{β1, β2} > 0. By applying (24) to
(15) and (16), and using (29), we have
EBn
(
V
(
P˜MCXYZSXˆ, PMCXYZSXˆ
))
= EBn
(
V
(
P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C
))
≤ 2 exp(−βn). (30)
Consider Slepian-Wolf decoder for protocol A. As long as R˜s ≥ H(X|Y ), we have [22,
Theorem 10.1]
lim
n→∞
EBn
(
PP˜ (Xˆ 6= X)
)
= 0. (31)
Next, we observe
EBn
(
V
(
P˜MCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
))
= EBn
∑
m,c,x,y,z,xˆ:
P˜ (m,c,x,y,z,xˆ)>P˜ (m,c,x,y,z)1{xˆ=x}
[
P˜ (m, c,x,y, z,x)− P˜ (m, c,x,y, z)1{xˆ = x}
]
(32)
1If the input alphabet X is infinite, minx∈X pX(x) might not exist. As a result, there might not be a finite upper bound on
the random variables log 1
pX(Xi)
. In such a case, Hoeffding inequality can not be applied.
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= EBn
∑
m,c,x,y,z,xˆ: xˆ 6=x
P˜ (m, c,x,y, z,x) = EBn
(
PP˜ (Xˆ 6= X)
)
. (33)
Equation (33) follows because P˜ (m, c,x,y, z, xˆ) > P˜ (m, c,x,y, z)1{xˆ = x} holds if and only if
1{xˆ = x} = 0, where P˜ (m, c,x,y, z, xˆ) factorizes as P˜ (m, c,x,y, z, xˆ) = P˜ (m, c,x,y, z)P˜ (xˆ|y, c)
and P˜ (xˆ|y, c) ≤ 1. Thus, using (31) and (33), we have that
lim
n→∞
EBn
(
V
(
P˜MCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
))
= 0, (34)
as long as R˜s ≥ H(X|Y ).
Now, we apply Lemma 2 to protocol A. In Lemma 2, set X = Xn, M˜ = 2nRs , C˜ = 2nR˜s ,
B = Bn, ZS = Z
n
S , for all S ∈ S, and γ = n(1 − ǫ˜2)(1 − α)H(X|V ), where ǫ˜2 > 0 and
Xn,ZnS, S are defined as in protocol A. In order to calculate PpXZS
(
(X,ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
)
, we only
need to consider the pairs (x, z) such that pX|ZS(x|z) > 0, since all the pairs (x, z) with
pX|ZS(x|z) = 0 belong to DSγ , by the definition of DSγ in (19). Since the sequence X is i.i.d.
and the channel pV |X is memoryless, we have, for all (x, z) with pX|ZS(x|z) > 0, that
pX|ZS(x|z) = pXSXSc |XSVSc (xS,xSc|xS,vSc) (35)
= pXSc |VSc(xSc|vSc) =
∏
i∈Sc
pX|V (xi|vi). (36)
Once again, using Hoeffding’s inequality, we have, for all S ∈ S,
PpXZS
(
(X,ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
)
= PpXZS
(
pX|ZS(X|ZS) > 0, log
1
pX|ZS(X|ZS)
≤ γ
)
(37)
= PpX|V
(
1
n− µ
∑
i∈Sc
log
1
pX|V (Xi|Vi)
≤ (1− ǫ˜2)H(X|V )
)
(38)
≤ exp (−β2(1− α)n) = δ
2, (39)
where β2 > 0, and (38) follows from (36). From (39), lim
n→∞
δ2 = 0, and hence, for sufficiently
large n , we have δ2 ∈
(
0, 1
4
)
. Thus, the conditions in Lemma 2 are satisfied.
Note that lim
n→∞
n(δ + δ2) = 0, and lim
n→∞
Hb(δ
2) = Hb( lim
n→∞
δ2) = 0 since Hb is a continuous
function. Thus,
lim
n→∞
ǫ˜ = ǫ1 + (Rs + R˜s) lim
n→∞
n(δ + δ2) + lim
n→∞
Hb(δ
2) = ǫ1. (40)
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By substituting the choices for M˜, C˜, γ, and |S||Zn| ≤ exp (n [ln 2 + ln (|X|+ |V|)]) in (20), and
using (40), we have that, for all ǫ1, ǫ′1 > 0 and ǫ˜ = ǫ1 + ǫ′1, there exist n∗ ∈ N and φ(ǫ1), κ > 0
such that, for all n ≥ n∗,
PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
P˜MCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
≥ ǫ˜
)
≤ exp (−φ(ǫ1)e
κn) , (41)
as long as Rs + R˜s < (1− ǫ˜2)(1− α)H(X|V ).
Take r > 0 and let Dn = maxS D(P˜MCZS ||pUMpUCpZS) and Kn , {Dn ≥ r}. Using (41), we
have that
∑∞
n=1 PBn(Kn) <∞. Thus, using the first Borel-Cantelli lemma yields
PBn (Kn infinitely often (i.o.)) = 0. (42)
This implies that, for all r > 0, PBn ({Dn < r} i.o.) = 1, i.e., the sequence Dn converges to
zero almost surely. Thus, the sequence Dn converges to zero in probability as well. We conclude
that, for Rs + R˜s < (1− ǫ˜2)(1− α)H(X|V ), we have
lim
n→∞
PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
P˜MCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
> 0
)
= 0. (43)
That is, protocol A is secure.
Next, we deduce that protocol B is also reliable and secure when R˜s ≥ H(X|Y ) and Rs+R˜s <
(1− ǫ˜2)(1−α)H(X|V ). First, we show that the reliability in (34) holds for protocol B as well.
We have
V
(
PMCXYZSXˆ, PMCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
≤ V
(
PMCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZSXˆ
)
+ V
(
P˜MCXYZSXˆ, PMCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
(44)
≤ V
(
PMCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZSXˆ
)
+ V
(
P˜MCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
+ V
(
P˜MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}, PMCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
(45)
= V
(
P˜MCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
+ 2V
(
P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C
)
, (46)
where (44) and (45) follow from the triangle inequality, and (46) follows since (15), (16) and
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(24) imply that
V
(
PMCXYZSXˆ, P˜MCXYZSXˆ
)
= V
(
P˜MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}, PMCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
= V
(
P˜MC, p
U
Mp
U
C
)
. (47)
Substituting (29) and (34) in (46) yields
lim
n→∞
EBn
(
V
(
PMCXYZSXˆ, PMCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
))
= 0. (48)
Second, we show that the secrecy property in (43) holds for protocol B. Using the union
bound, we have
PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
> 0
)
≤ PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
> 0, V(P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C) > 0
)
+ PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
> 0, V(P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C) = 0
)
(49)
≤ PBn
(
V(P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C) > 0
)
+ PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
P˜MCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
> 0
)
. (50)
Equation (50) follows since V(P˜MC , pUMpUC) = 0 if and only if P˜MC(m, c) = pUMpUC for all m
and c, and hence PMCZS = pUMpUCPZS |MC = P˜MCP˜ZS |MC = P˜MCZS , where
PZS |MC(z|m, c) =
∑
x∈Xn
pZS |X(z|x)P˜X|MC(x|m, c) = P˜ZS |MC(z|m, c). (51)
Using the exponential decay in (29) and Markov inequality, we have, for any r > 0, that
∞∑
n=1
PBn
(
V(P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C) > r
)
≤
1
r
∞∑
n=1
EBn
(
V(P˜MC , p
U
Mp
U
C)
)
(52)
≤
2
r
∞∑
n=1
exp(−βn) <∞, (53)
where β > 0. Thus, using the Borel-Cantelli lemma, as in the derivation for (43), we have
lim
n→∞
PBn
(
V(P˜MC, p
U
Mp
U
C) > 0
)
= 0. (54)
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By substituting (43) and (54) in (50), we get
lim
n→∞
PBn
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
> 0
)
= 0. (55)
Now, we show the existence of a binning realization, and hence an encoder and decoder, such
that the reliability and secrecy properties, in (48) and (55), hold for protocol B. By applying
Lemma 3 to the random sequence {Bn}n≥1 and the functions V
(
PMCXYZSXˆ, PMCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
,
1
{
maxS∈SD(PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS) > 0
}
, while using (48) and (55), there exists a sequence of
binning realizations b∗n = (b∗1,n, b∗2,n), with a corresponding joint distribution p∗ for protocol B,
such that
lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
MCXYZSXˆ
, p∗MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
= 0, (56)
lim
n→∞
1
{
max
S∈S
D(p∗MCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS) > 0
}
= 0, (57)
where M = b∗1,n(Xn) and C = b∗2,n(Xn).
Next, we introduce the random variable Mˆ to the two joint distributions in (56), where Mˆ is
a deterministic function of the random sequence Xˆn, i.e., p∗
Mˆ |Xˆ
(mˆ|xˆ) = 1
{
mˆ = b∗1,n(xˆ)
}
. Using
(24) and (56), we have
lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
MCXYZSXˆMˆ
, p∗MCXYZS1{Mˆ = M}
)
= lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
MCXYZSXˆ
1
{
Mˆ = b∗1,n(Xˆ)
}
, p∗MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}1
{
Mˆ = b∗1,n(Xˆ)
}) (58)
= lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
MCXYZSXˆ
, p∗MCXYZS1{Xˆ = X}
)
= 0, (59)
where (58) follows since p∗
Mˆ |MCXYZSXˆ
= p∗
Mˆ |Xˆ
= 1
{
Mˆ = b∗1,n(Xˆ)
}
, and that Mˆ = M if and
only if Xˆ = X and Mˆ = b∗1,n(Xˆ). We then have
lim
n→∞
EC
(
Pp∗(Mˆ 6= M |C)
)
= lim
n→∞
∑
c
pUC
∑
m,mˆ: mˆ6=m
p∗
MMˆ |C
(m, mˆ|c) (60)
= lim
n→∞
∑
m,mˆ,c: mˆ 6=m
p∗
MMˆC
(m, mˆ, c) (61)
= lim
n→∞
∑
m,mˆ,c: p∗(m,mˆ,c)>pU
M
pU
C
1{mˆ=m}
[
p∗
MMˆC
(m, mˆ, c)− pUMp
U
C1{mˆ = m}
] (62)
= lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
MMˆC
, pUMp
U
C1{Mˆ = M}
)
(63)
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= lim
n→∞
V
(
p∗
MCXYZSXˆMˆ
, p∗MCXYZS1{Mˆ = M}
)
= 0. (64)
Equation (62) follows because p∗
MMˆC
> pUMp
U
C1{Mˆ = M} if and only if 1{Mˆ = M} = 0
where p∗
MMˆC
factorizes as pUMpUCp∗Mˆ |MC and p
∗
Mˆ |MC
≤ 1, while equation (64) follows from (24)
and (59).
We also have that
PC
(
max
S
D(p∗MZS |C ||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |C
) > 0
)
≤ PC
(
max
S
D
(
p∗MZS |C ||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |C
)
> 0, and max
S
D
(
p∗MCZn
S
||pUMp
U
CpZS
)
= 0
)
+ PC
(
max
S
D
(
p∗MZS |C ||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |C
)
> 0, and max
S
D
(
p∗MCZn
S
||pUMp
U
CpZS
)
> 0
)
(65)
≤ PC
(
max
S
D
(
p∗MZS |C ||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |C
)
> 0, and ∀S, p∗MCZS(m, c, z) = p
U
Mp
U
CpZS(z), ∀m, c, z
)
+ PC
(
max
S
D(p∗MCZn
S
||pUMp
U
CpZS) > 0
)
(66)
= 1
{
max
S
D(p∗MCZn
S
||pUMp
U
CpZS) > 0
}
, (67)
where (66) follows since maxS D
(
p∗MCZn
S
||pUMp
U
CpZS
)
= 0, if and only if, for all S ∈ S,
p∗MCZS(m, c, z) = p
U
Mp
U
CpZS(z) for all m, c, and z. (67) follows because the first probability
term on the right hand side of (66) is equal to zero. Thus, using (57), we get
lim
n→∞
PC
(
max
S∈S
D(p∗MZS |C ||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |C
) > 0
)
= 0. (68)
Let us express the random variable C as an explicit function of n, i.e., C = Cn = b∗2,n(Xn). In
order to eliminate Cn from the channel model in protocol B, we apply Lemma 3 to the random se-
quence {Cn}n≥1 and the functions Pp∗
(
Mˆ 6= M |Cn
)
, 1
{
maxS∈SD
(
p∗MZS |Cn ||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |Cn
)
> 0
}
,
while using (64) and (68), which implies that there exists at least one realization {c∗n} such that
lim
n→∞
Pp∗
(
Mˆ 6= M |Cn = c
∗
n
)
= 0, and (69)
lim
n→∞
max
S∈S
Ip∗ (M ;ZS|Cn = c
∗
n) = 0, (70)
where Ip∗ is the mutual information with respect to the distribution p∗. Equation (70) follows
because lim
n→∞
1
{
maxS∈SD(p
∗
MZS |Cn=c∗n
||pUMp
∗
ZS |Cn=c∗n
) > 0
}
= 0 implies that there exists n′ large
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enough such that, for all n ≥ n′, we have
max
S
D
(
p∗MZS |Cn=c∗n||p
U
Mp
∗
ZS |Cn=c∗n
)
= max
S
Ip∗ (M ;ZS |Cn = c
∗
n) = 0. (71)
Finally, let p˜∗ be the induced distribution for protocol A corresponding to b∗n. We use p˜∗X|M,Cn=c∗n
as the encoder and (p˜∗
Xˆ|Y,Cn=c∗n
, b∗1,n(Xˆ)) as the decoder for the original model. By combining
the rate conditions Rs + R˜s < (1− ǫ˜2)(1− α)H(X|V ), R˜s ≥ H(X|Y ), and taking ǫ˜2 → 0, the
rate Rs = maxpX [I(X ; Y )− I(X ;V )− αH(X|V )] is achievable.
So far, we have considered the case U = X . Next, we prefix a discrete memoryless channel
pX|U to the original channel model in Figure 1. The main channel for the new model is pY |U
and the wiretapper channel is described by pX|U and (2). The proof for this case follows similar
steps to the proof above. In particular, for protocol A, we consider the i.i.d. input sequence Un =
[U1, U2, · · · , Un]. When we apply Lemma 2 to protocol A, we set γ = n(1 − ǫ˜2)[αH(U |X) +
(1− α)H(U |V )], and for pU|ZS(u|z) > 0, we have, for any S ∈ S, that
pU|ZS(u|z) = pUSUSc |XSVSc (uS,uSc|xS,vSc) (72)
= pUS |XSVSc (uS|xS,vSc) pUSc |USXSVSc (uSc|uS,xS,vSc) (73)
= pUS |XS(uS|xS) pUSc |VSc(uSc|vSc) (74)
=
∏
i∈S
pU |X(ui|xi)
∏
i∈Sc
pU |V (ui|vi), (75)
where (74) and (75) follow since the sequences Un,Xn, and Vn are i.i.d. and the channels
pX|U and pV |X are discrete memoryless channels. Using (75), the choice for γ, and Hoeffding’s
inequality, the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied, and we deduce the rate condition
Rs + R˜s < (1− ǫ˜2)[αH(U |X) + (1− α)H(U |V )] (76)
required for secrecy of protocol A. Note that H(U |X) = H(U |X, V ) because of the Markov
chain U − X − V . By combining (76) with the rate condition R˜s ≥ H(U |Y ) required for the
Slepian-Wolf decoder, we obtain the achievability of (7). The cardinality bound on U, |U| ≤ |X|,
follows using [22, Appendix C]. This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 1.
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Fig. 3: A wiretap channel model whose secrecy capacity is equal to that of Figure 1.
V. CONVERSE
Consider the channel model illustrated in Figure 3, where the wiretapper observes the outputs
of two independent channels, with Xn being the input to both the channels. The first channel
to the wiretapper is the DMC pV |X which outputs Vn. The second channel is the wiretapper
channel in the wiretap II channel model, i.e., the wiretapper chooses S ⊆ J1, nK and observes
Z˜nS = [Z˜
S
1 , · · · , Z˜
S
n ], where Z˜Si = Xi for i ∈ S, and Z˜Si =?, i.e., erasures, otherwise.
We show that, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the strong secrecy capacity for this channel model, CEQs (α), is
equal to the strong secrecy capacity of the original channel model, Cs(α), in (7). Since the main
channels in the two models are the same, it suffices to show that I(M ;ZnS) = I(M ; Z˜nSVn) for
all S ∈ S, where ZnS is defined as in (2). This follows because, for all S ∈ S, we have
H(M |Z˜SV) = H(M,X|Z˜S,V)−H(X|M, Z˜S,V) (77)
= H(X|Z˜S,V) +H(M |X, Z˜S,V)−H(X|M, Z˜S,V) (78)
= H(X|Z˜S,V)−H(X|M, Z˜S,V) (79)
= H(XS,XSc|XS,VS,VSc)−H(XS,XSc|M,XS,VS,VSc) (80)
= H(XSc|XS,VS,VSc)−H(XSc|M,XS,VS,VSc) (81)
= H(XSc|XS,VSc)−H(XSc|M,XS,VSc) (82)
= H(X|ZS)−H(X|M,ZS) (83)
= H(X,M |ZS)−H(X|M,ZS) = H(M |ZS), (84)
where (79) and (84) follow because H(M |X) = 0, and (82) follows since the channel pV |X is
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Fig. 4: A discrete memoryless equivalent wiretap channel model.
memoryless which results in the Markov chains XSc−XSVSc−VS and XSc−MXSVSc−VS .
Next, consider the channel model illustrated in Figure 4, which is the same as the channel
model in Figure 3, except we replace the second channel to the wiretapper with a discrete
memoryless erasure channel (DM-EC) with erasure probability 1−α. The output of the second
channel to the wiretapper is Zn. For this model, we have the Markov chain Vn−Xn−Zn since
the two channels to the wiretapper are independent. Since the two channels to the wiretapper
are discrete memoryless, we have
pVZ|X(v, z|x) = pV|X(v|x) pZ|X(z|x)
=
n∏
i=1
pV |X(vi|xi) pZ|X(zi|xi) =
n∏
i=1
pV Z|X(vi, zi|xi). (85)
That is, the combined channel to the wiretapper is a discrete memoryless channel, making the
channel model in Figure 4 a discrete memoryless wiretap channel. The strong secrecy capacity
for this model CEQ2s (α) is given by
C
EQ2
s (α) = max
U−X−Y V Z
[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;V Z)]+. (86)
In order to compute CEQ2s (α) in (86), we define the random variable Φ ∼ Bern(α) whose n
i.i.d. samples represent the erasure process in the DM-EC, where Φ = 0 when Z = X and Φ = 1
when Z =?. Thus, Φ is determined by Z, and hence, the Markov chains U − X − Y V Z and
V −X−Z imply the Markov chains U−X−Y V ZΦ and V −X−ZΦ. Also, Φ is independent
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from X , since the erasure process is independent from the input to the channel. Thus, we have
pΦ|UV (φ|u, v) =
∑
x∈X
pΦX|UV (φ, x|u, v) =
∑
x∈X
pX|UV (x|u, v) pΦ|XUV (φ|x, u, v)
= pΦ(φ)
∑
x∈X
pX|UV (x|u, v) = pΦ(φ) (87)
pΦ|V (φ|v) =
∑
x∈X
pΦX|V (φ, x|v) =
∑
x∈X
pX|V (x|v) pΦ|XV (φ|x, v)
= pΦ(φ)
∑
x∈X
pX|V (x|v) = pΦ(φ). (88)
where (87) and (88) follow since pΦ|XUV = pΦ|XV = pΦ|X = pΦ due to the Markov chains
U − XV − Φ and V − X − Φ, and the independence of Φ and X . Since pΦ|UV = pΦ|V = pΦ,
then Φ and U are conditionally independent given V . Thus, we have
I(U ;Z|V ) = I(U ;Z,Φ|V ) = I(U ;Z|Φ, V ) (89)
= P(Φ = 0)I(U ;Z|Φ = 0, V ) + P(Φ = 1)I(U ;Z|Φ = 1, V ) (90)
= αI(U ;X|V ) + (1− α)I(U ; ?|V ) = αI(U ;X|V ). (91)
Substituting (91) in (86), we have
C
EQ2
s (α) = max
U−X−Y V
[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;V )− αI(U ;X|V )]+. (92)
Next, we use similar arguments to [8, Section V-C] to show that CEQs (α) ≤ CEQ2s (α) for
any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and sufficiently large n. The idea is that when the number of erasures of
the DM-EC in the latter channel model (Figure 4) is greater than or equal to (1 − α)n, the
wiretapper’s channel in the former (Figure 3) is better than her channel in the latter, since the
wiretapper in the former is more capable and encounters a smaller number of erasures. Thus,
C
EQ
s (α) ≤ C
EQ2
s (α) for this case. The result is established by using Sanov’s theorem in method
of types [23, Theorem 11.4.1] to show that the probability that the DM-EC causes erasures less
than (1− α)n goes to 0 as n→∞.
In particular, we first show that, for 0 ≤ λ < α ≤ 1, we have CEQs (α) ≤ CEQ2s (λ). To do
so, we show that every achievable strong secrecy rate for the channel model in Figure 3 is also
achievable for the channel model in Figure 4. Fix λ such that 0 ≤ λ < α ≤ 1, and let Rs be
an achievable strong secrecy rate for the former channel model. Thus, there exists a sequence
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of (n, 2nRS) channel codes
{
CEQn
}
n≥1
such that
lim
n→∞
P
(
Mˆ 6= M |CEQn
)
= 0, and lim
n→∞
max
S∈S
I
(
M ; Z˜S ,V|C
EQ
n
)
= 0. (93)
We show that the rate Rs is also an achievable strong secrecy rate for the channel model in
Figure 4 by showing that the sequence of (n, 2nRs) codes
{
CEQn
}
n≥1
satisfies the constraints
lim
n→∞
P
(
Mˆ 6= M |CEQn
)
= 0 and lim
n→∞
maxS∈S I
(
M ;Z,V|CEQn
)
= 0 for this channel model.
The main channel in the two models is the same, and hence, the sequence of (n, 2nRs) codes{
CEQn
}
n≥1
achieves the reliability constraint for both channel models. Thus, it remains to show
that
{
CEQn
}
n≥1
achieves lim
n→∞
maxS∈S I
(
M ;Z,V|CEQn
)
= 0.
Since lim
n→∞
maxS∈S I(M ; Z˜S,V) = 0, then for any ǫ0 > 0, there exists n0 ∈ N such that for
all n ≥ n0, we have
max
S∈S
I
(
M ; Z˜S ,V|C
EQ
n
)
= I
(
M ;V|CEQn
)
+max
S∈S
I
(
M ; Z˜S|V,C
EQ
n
)
≤
ǫ0
2
. (94)
Let us define Z˜ = X ∪ {?}. For every zn ∈ Z˜n, define
N(zn) , {k ∈ J1, nK : zk =?} (95)
Θ(zn) = 1
{
|N(zn)| ≤ ⌈(1− α)n⌉
}
. (96)
That is, N(zn) represents the number of erasures in the sequence zn, while Θ(zn) indicates
whether the sequence zn has erasures less than or equal to ⌈(1− α)n⌉.
For simplicity of notation, we drop CEQn from the conditioning in (94); it is understood
implicitly that the mutual information is calculated with respect to the code CEQn . Since Θ(Zn)
is a deterministic function of Zn, the Markov chains M −Xn −VnZn and MVn −Xn − Zn
imply the Markov chains M −Xn−VnZnΘ(Zn) and MVn−Xn−ZnΘ(Zn). Also, Θ(Zn) is
independent from Xn. Thus, we have
pΘ(Z)|MV(θ|m,v) =
∑
x∈Xn
pΘ(Z)X|MV(θ,x|m,v) =
∑
x∈Xn
pX|MV(x|m,v) pΘ(Z)|XMV(θ|x, m,v)
= pΘ(Z)(θ)
∑
x∈Xn
pX|MV(x|m,v) = pΘ(Z)(θ) (97)
pΘ(Z)|V(θ|v) =
∑
x∈Xn
pΘ(Z)X|V(θ,x|v) =
∑
x∈Xn
pX|V(x|v) pΘ(Z)|XV(θ|x,v)
24
= pΘ(Z)(θ)
∑
x∈Xn
pX|V(x|v) = pΘ(Z)(θ). (98)
From (97) and (98), M and Θ(Z) are conditionally independent given Vn, and hence,
I(M ;Z|V) = I(M ;Z,Θ(Z)|V) (99)
= I(M ; Θ(Z)|V) + I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z)) (100)
= I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z)) (101)
= P(Θ(Z) = 0)I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z) = 0) + P(Θ(Z) = 1)I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z) = 1). (102)
We upper bound each term in the right hand side of (102). The first term is upper bounded
by
I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z) = 0) = I
(
M ;Z|V,
{
|N(Z)| > ⌈(1− α)n⌉
}) (103)
≤ I
(
M ;Z|V,
{
|N(Z)| = ⌈(1− α)n⌉
}) (104)
≤ max
S∈S
I(M ; Z˜S |V). (105)
We also have that
I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z) = 1) ≤ H(Z) ≤ n log(|X|+ 1). (106)
Next we upper bound P(Θ(Z) = 1). Take ν such that λ < ν < α, and hence, we have
⌈(1 − α)n⌉ ≤ (1 − ν)n < (1 − λ)n. Let Φ1,Φ2, · · · ,Φn be a sequence of i.i.d. binary random
variables which represents the erasure process of the DM-EC in the model in Figure 4 (Φi = 1 if
Zi = Xi, and Φi = 0 if Zi =?), where Φi is distributed according to QΦ = Bern(λ). Let QnΦ be the
n-letter distribution of the sequence {Φi}ni=1. For each ξ = ln , with l ∈ J⌈νn⌉, nK, i.e., ν ≤ ξ < 1,
define the distribution P (ξ)Φ = Bern(ξ), and let P be the set of all of these distributions. Let T (P )
denote the type class of the distribution P , i.e., all possible n-length sequences with the type
(empirical distribution) P [23, Section 11.1]. Define the set T ,
{
T (P
(ξ)
Φ ) : (1− ξ) ≤ (1− ν)
}
.
Using Sanov’s theorem [23, Theorem 11.4.1], we have
P(Θ(Z) = 1) = PQnΦ
(
|N(Z)| ≤ ⌈(1− α)n⌉
)
(107)
≤ PQnΦ
(
|N(Z)| ≤ (1− ν)n
)
(108)
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= PQnΦ
(∣∣ {k ∈ J1, nK : Φk = 1} ∣∣ ≤ (1− ν)n) (109)
= PQnΦ(T) = PQnΦ(P) ≤ (n+ 1)
2 2−nD(P
∗
Φ||QΦ), (110)
where
P ∗Φ = argmin
P
(ξ)
Φ ∈P
D(P
(ξ)
Φ ||QΦ) = argmin
ξ: ξ≥ν
(
ξ log
ξ
λ
+ (1− ξ)
1− ξ
1− λ
)
= Bern(ν). (111)
Note that D(P ∗Φ||QΦ) > 0 since ν 6= λ.
Using (106) and (110), the second term in the right hand side of (102) is upper bounded by
log(|X|+ 1)n(n + 1)2 2−nD(P
∗
Φ||QΦ) −→
n→∞
0. (112)
Thus, for ǫ0 > 0, there exists n1 ∈ N such that, for all n ≥ n1,
P(Θ(Z) = 1)I(M ;Z|V,Θ(Z) = 1) ≤
ǫ0
2
. (113)
Using (94), (102), (105), and (113), we have, for sufficiently large n, that
I
(
M ;Z,V|CEQn
)
= I
(
M ;V|CEQn
)
+ I
(
M ;Z|V,CEQn
) (114)
≤ I
(
M ;V|CEQn
)
+max
S∈S
I
(
M ; Z˜S|V,C
EQ
n
)
+
ǫ0
2
≤ ǫ0. (115)
Thus, for 0 ≤ λ < α ≤ 1, we have CEQs (α) ≤ CEQ2s (λ). The right hand side of (92) is a
continuous function of α, for 0 < α < 1 [8, Lemma 6]. Thus, by taking λ → α, we have
C
EQ
s (α) ≤ C
EQ2
s (α). Note that for α = 0, 1, we have CEQs (α) = CEQ2s (α). Thus, the secrecy
capacity of the original model in Figure 1 is upper bounded by (92). This completes the proof
for Theorem 1.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the converse proof for Theorem 1, we have shown that the strong secrecy capacity Cs(α)
for the new wiretap channel model is equal to the strong secrecy capacity when the wiretapper,
in addition to observing µ transmitted symbols of her choice noiselessly, observes the whole
sequence Vn. This is not surprising because observing noisy versions of the transmitted symbols
through the DMC pV |X in the positions where noiseless versions are available does not increase
the wiretapper’s information about the message. The expression for the strong secrecy capacity
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of the new wiretap channel model in (7) is thus intuitive where I(U, V ) represents the secrecy
cost due to observing the whole sequence Vn, and αI(U ;X|V ) represents the secrecy cost due to
observing a fraction α of the transmitted symbols noiselessly, given the wiretapper’s knowledge
of the V outputs in these positions. Furthermore, the alternative characterization for the strong
secrecy capacity of the new wiretap channel model in (8) is again intuitively pleasing, where the
overall secrecy cost is represented by a weighted sum of the secrecy costs due to the noiseless
and the noisy observations at the wiretapper, i.e., αI(U ;X) and (1− α)I(U ;V ).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have introduced a new wiretap channel model and derived its strong secrecy
capacity. This model generalizes the classical wiretap channel [1], [2] to one with a wiretapper
who chooses a fixed-length subset of the transmitted codeword symbols to perfectly access, and
generalizes the wiretap channel II with a discrete memoryless main channel in [7] to one with a
wiretapper who observes the output of a noisy channel instead of the erasures. The wiretapper in
this model is still passive, yet she is more capable than a classical wiretapper since she can tap
a subset of the symbols of her choosing noiselessly, while still receiving the remaining symbols
through a channel. Our secrecy capacity result quantifies the secrecy cost of this additional
capability of the wiretapper, with respect to the previous wiretap channel models.
As for future directions, exploring the multi-terminal extensions of this new model is the
natural next step, similar to multi-terminal extensions for Wyner’s original model, e.g., [24]–
[29]. Additionally, it is of interest to seek new and more powerful wiretapper models against
which information theoretic security guarantees can be established.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For m, c ∈ J1, M˜K× J1, C˜K, we have
PMC(m, c) =
∑
x∈X
pX(x)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}. (116)
We also have that, for all x ∈ X,
EB (1 {B1(x) = m}1 {B2(x) = c}) = P(B1(x) = m)P(B2(x) = c) =
1
M˜C˜
. (117)
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Thus, we have EB(PMC) = 1M˜C˜ = p
U
Mp
U
C . For all m and c, define the random variables
P1(m, c) =
∑
x/∈Dγ
pX(x)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c} (118)
P2(m, c) =
∑
x∈Dγ
pX(x)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}. (119)
Note that PMC(m, c) = P1(m, c) + P2(m, c). Thus, we have
EB
(
V(PMC, p
U
Mp
U
C)
)
=
1
2
EB
(∑
m,c
|PMC(m, c)− EB (PMC(m, c))|
)
(120)
=
1
2
EB
(∑
m,c
∣∣∣∣∣
2∑
i=1
(Pi(m, c)− EB (Pi(m, c)))
∣∣∣∣∣
)
(121)
≤
1
2
∑
m,c
EB |P1(m, c)− EB (P1(m, c))|+
1
2
∑
m,c
EB |P2(m, c)− EB (P2(m, c))| , (122)
where (122) follows from the triangle inequality. We now upper bound each term on the right
hand side of (122). For the first term, we have
1
2
∑
m,c
EB |P1(m, c)− EB (P1(m, c))| ≤
∑
m,c
EB (P1(m, c)) (123)
=
∑
m,c
∑
x/∈Dγ
pX(x)EB (1 {B1(x) = m}1 {B2(x) = c}) (124)
=
∑
x/∈Dγ
pX(x) = P(X /∈ Dγ), (125)
where (123) follows from the triangle inequality.
For the second term in the right hand side of (122), we have
1
2
∑
m,c
EB |P2(m, c)− EB (P2(m, c))| =
1
2
∑
m,c
EB
√
(P2(m, c)− EB (P2(m, c)))
2 (126)
≤
∑
m,c
√
EB (P2(m, c)− EB (P2(m, c)))
2 (127)
=
∑
m,c
√
VarB (P2(m, c)) ≤
1
2
√
M˜C˜
2γ
, (128)
where (127) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of square root. The inequality
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in (128) follows because, for all m and c, we have
VarB (P2(m, c)) = VarB

∑
x∈Dγ
pX(x)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}

 (129)
=
∑
x∈Dγ
VarB
(
pX(x)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}
)
(130)
≤
∑
x∈Dγ
p2X(x)EB
(
1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}
)
(131)
=
1
M˜C˜
∑
x∈Dγ
p2X(x) (132)
≤
2−γ
M˜C˜
∑
x∈Dγ
pX(x) ≤
2−γ
M˜C˜
, (133)
where (130) follows since the random variables
{
pX(x)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}
}
x∈Dγ
are
independent due to the structure of the random binning, and (133) follows because pX(x) ≤ 2−γ
for all x ∈ Dγ . Lemma 1 follows from substituting (125) and (128) in (122).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first state the following lemma, which provides a variation of Chernoff bound.
Lemma 6 (A variation on Chernoff bound:) Let U1, U2, · · · , Un be a sequence of non-negative
independent random variables with respective means E(Ui) = m¯i. If Ui ∈ [0, b], for all i ∈ J1, nK,
and
∑n
i=1 m¯i ≤ m¯, then, for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1], we have
P
(
n∑
i=1
Ui ≥ (1 + ǫ)m¯
)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ2
m¯
3b
)
. (134)
Proof: The proof is adapted from [8, Appendix C]. The details are relegated to Appendix C. 
A. High probability Z-set:
For all S ∈ S, define the set
AS ,
{
z ∈ Z : PpX|ZS
(
(X, z) ∈ DSγ
)
≥ 1− δ
}
. (135)
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Recall that PpXZS
(
(X,ZS) ∈ D
S
γ
)
≥ 1−δ2 by assumption. Using Markov inequality, we have
PpZS
(AcS) = PpZS
(
PpX|ZS
(
(X,ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
)
≥ δ
)
(136)
≤
1
δ
EpZS
(
PpX|ZS
(
(X,ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
)) (137)
=
1
δ
PpXZS
(
(X,ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
) (138)
≤
δ2
δ
= δ. (139)
B. Typical and non-typical events:
For all m, c ∈ J1, M˜K× J1, C˜K, z ∈ Z, and S ∈ S, define the random variables
P S1 (m, c|z) =
∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|z)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}1
{
(x, z) ∈ DSγ
} (140)
P S2 (m, c|z) =
∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|z)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}1
{
(x, z) /∈ DSγ
}
. (141)
Thus, we have, for all m, c, z, and S, that
PMC|ZS(m, c|z) =
∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|z)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c} (142)
= P S1 (m, c|z) + P
S
2 (m, c|z). (143)
Note that, for fixed z ∈ Z and S ∈ S, each of the the random variables P Si (m, c|z), i = 1, 2, is
identically distributed for all m, c ∈ J1, M˜K×J1, C˜K due to the symmetry in the random binning.
We then fix z ∈ Z and S ∈ S, and let P S1 (m, c|z) =
∑
x∈X Ux(m, c, z, S), where
Ux(m, c, z, S) = pX|ZS(x|z)1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}1
{
(x, z) ∈ DSγ
}
. (144)
The random variables {Ux(m, c, z, S)}x∈X are non-negative and independent, and for all x ∈ X,
Ux(m, c, z, S) ≤ pX|ZS(x|z)1
{
(x, z) ∈ DSγ
}
< 2−γ , (145)
where pX|ZS(x|z) < 2−γ , for all (x, z) ∈ DSγ . Also, we have
∑
x∈X
EB(Ux(m, c, z, S))
=
∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|z)EB
(
1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}
)
1
{
(x, z) ∈ DSγ
} (146)
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=
1
M˜C˜
∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|z)1
{
(x, z) ∈ DSγ
} (147)
=
1
M˜C˜
PpX|ZS
(
(X, z) ∈ DSγ
)
. (148)
By applying Lemma 6 to the random variables {Ux(m, c, z, S)}x∈X, with m¯ =
PpX|ZS
((X,z)∈DSγ )
M˜C˜
and b = 2−γ , we have, for every ǫ1 ∈ [0, 1] and z ∈ AS , that
PB
(
P S1 (m, c|z) ≥
1 + ǫ1
M˜C˜
)
≤ P
(∑
x∈X
Ux(m, c, z, S) ≥
1 + ǫ1
M˜C˜
PpX|ZS
(
(X, z) ∈ DSγ
)) (149)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ21 PpX|ZS
(
(X, z) ∈ DSγ
)
2γ
3M˜C˜
)
(150)
≤ exp
(
−ǫ21(1− δ)2
γ
3M˜C˜
)
, (151)
where (149) follows since PpX|ZS
(
(X, z) ∈ DSγ
)
≤ 1, and (151) follows because, for all z ∈ AS,
we have PpX|ZS
(
(X, z) ∈ DSγ
)
≥ (1− δ).
We also have have that,
EpZS
(∑
m,c
P S2 (m, c|ZS)
)
= EpZS
(∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|ZS)1
{
(x, ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
}∑
m,c
1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c}
)
(152)
=
∑
z∈Z
pZS(z)
∑
x∈X
pX|ZS(x|z)1
{
(x, z) /∈ DSγ
}
=
∑
(x,z)/∈DSγ
pXZS(x, z) (153)
= PpXZS
(
(X,ZS) /∈ D
S
γ
)
≤ δ2, (154)
where (153) follows since every x ∈ X is assigned to only one pair (m, c), and hence,
∑
m,c
1{B1(x) = m}1{B2(x) = c} = 1. (155)
C. Good binning functions:
Let b , (b1, b2) : X 7→ J1, M˜K× J1, C˜K be a realization of the random binning B. Recall that
the random variable P S1 (m, c|z) is identically distributed for every m and c. We then define the
class G of binning functions b as
G ,
{
b : P S1 (m, c|z) <
1 + ǫ1
M˜C˜
, for all S ∈ S and all z ∈ AS
}
. (156)
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Using the union bound and (151), we have that
PB (G
c) = PB
(
P S1 (m, c|z) ≥
1 + ǫ1
M˜C˜
, for some S ∈ S, or z ∈ AS
)
(157)
= PB
(⋃
S∈S
⋃
z∈AS
P S1 (m, c|z) ≥
1 + ǫ1
M˜C˜
)
(158)
≤
∑
S∈S
∑
z∈AS
PB
(
P S1 (m, c|z) ≥
1 + ǫ1
M˜C˜
)
(159)
≤
∑
S∈S
|AS| exp
(
−ǫ21(1− δ)2
γ
3M˜C˜
)
(160)
≤ |S||Z| exp
(
−ǫ21(1− δ)2
γ
3M˜C˜
)
. (161)
Take b such that b ∈ G, and set M = b1(X) and C = b2(X). For every S ∈ S, we have
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
= EpZS
(
D(PMC|ZS ||p
U
Mp
U
C)
) (162)
= EpZS
(∑
m,c
PMC|ZS(m, c|ZS) log
PMC|ZS(m, c|ZS)
pUMp
U
C
)
(163)
= EpZS
(∑
m,c
2∑
i=1
P Si (m, c|ZS) log
(
M˜C˜
2∑
i=1
P Si (m, c|ZS)
))
(164)
= EpZS
(∑
m,c
2∑
i=1
P Si (m, c|ZS) log
∑2
i=1 P
S
i (m, c|ZS)
1
M˜C˜
∑2
i=1
∑
m,c P
S
i (m, c|ZS)
)
(165)
≤ EpZS
(
2∑
i=1
∑
m,c
P Si (m, c|ZS) log
M˜C˜P Si (m, c|ZS)∑
m,c P
S
i (m, c|ZS)
)
(166)
=
2∑
i=1
EpZS
(∑
m,c
P Si (m, c|ZS) log
(
M˜C˜P Si (m, c|ZS)
))
+ EpZS
(
2∑
i=1
∑
m,c
P Si (m, c|ZS) log
1∑
m,c P
S
i (m, c|ZS)
)
(167)
where (165) follows because ∑m,c∑2i=1 P Si (m, c|ZS) = ∑m,c PMC|ZS(m, c|z) = 1, and (166)
follows from the log-sum inequality.
Now, we upper bound each in (167) term. For b ∈ G and every S ∈ S, we have
EpZS
(∑
m,c
P S1 (m, c|ZS) log
(
M˜C˜P S1 (m, c|ZS)
))
= EpZS
(∑
m,c
P S1 (m, c|ZS) log
(
M˜C˜P S1 (m, c|ZS)
)
1 {ZS ∈ AS}
)
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+ EpZS
(∑
m,c
P S1 (m, c|ZS) log
(
M˜C˜P S1 (m, c|ZS)
)
1 {ZS /∈ AS}
)
(168)
< log(1 + ǫ1) +
∑
x,z
pXZS(x, z) log
(
M˜C˜P S1 (m, c|z)
)
1 {z /∈ AS} (169)
≤ log(1 + ǫ1) + log(M˜C˜) PpZS (ZS /∈ AS) (170)
≤ ǫ1 + δ log(M˜C˜), (171)
where (169) follows because, for every b ∈ G and S ∈ S, we have M˜C˜P S1 (m, c|ZS) < (1 + ǫ)
for ZS ∈ AS and every m, c, and (171) follows from (139).
Using (154), we have, for every S ∈ S, that
EpZS
(∑
m,c
P S2 (m, c|ZS) log
(
M˜C˜P S2 (m, c|ZS)
))
≤ log(M˜C˜) EpZS
(∑
m,c
P S2 (m, c|ZS)
)
≤ δ2 log(M˜C˜). (172)
We also have, for every S ∈ S, that
EpZS
(
2∑
i=1
∑
m,c
P Si (m, c|ZS) log
1∑
m,c P
S
i (m, c|ZS)
)
= EpZS
(
Hb
(
PpX|ZS
((X,ZS) ∈ D
S
γ )
))
(173)
≤ Hb
(
EpZS
(
PpX|ZS
((X,ZS) ∈ D
S
γ )
))
(174)
= Hb(PpXZS ((X,ZS) ∈ D
S
γ )) (175)
≤ Hb(1− δ
2) = Hb(δ
2), (176)
where (174) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of Hb, and (176) follows since
Hb(x) is monotonically decreasing in x ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. Equation (173) follows since∑2i=1∑m,c P Si (m, c|ZS) =
1, and
∑
m,c P
S
1 (m, c|ZS) = PpX|ZS
(
(X,ZS) ∈ D
S
γ
)
.
By substituting (171), 172), and (176) in (167), we have, for every b ∈ G and S ∈ S, that
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
< ǫ1 + (δ + δ
2) log(M˜C˜) +Hb(δ
2) = ǫ˜. (177)
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Thus, we have
PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
≥ ǫ˜
)
= 1− PB
(
max
S∈S
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
< ǫ˜
)
(178)
= 1− PB
(
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
< ǫ˜, for all S ∈ S
) (179)
≤ 1− PB(G) = PB(G
c) (180)
≤ |S||Z| exp
(
ǫ21(1− δ)2
γ
3M˜C˜
)
, (181)
where the inequality in (180) follows because (177) implies that
PB
(
D
(
PMCZS ||p
U
Mp
U
CpZS
)
< ǫ˜, for all S ∈ S
)
≥ PB(G). (182)
This completes the proof for Lemma 2. The analysis in this proof is adapted from [30, Appendix].
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Let U1, U2, · · · , Un be a sequence of non-negative independent random variables, which satisfy
the conditions of the Lemma. For any θ > 0, we have
P
( n∑
i=1
Ui ≥ (1 + ǫ)m¯
)
= P
(
eθ
∑n
i=1 Ui ≥ eθ(1+ǫ)m¯
)
(183)
≤
E
(
eθ
∑n
i=1 Ui
)
eθ(1+ǫ)m¯
(184)
=
∏n
i=1 E
(
eθUi
)
eθ(1+ǫ)m¯
(185)
≤
∏n
i=1
(
1 + e
θb−1
b
E(Ui)
)
eθ(1+ǫ)m¯
(186)
≤
∏n
i=1 e
eθb−1
b
m¯i
eθ(1+ǫ)m¯
(187)
≤
e
eθb−1
b
m¯
eθ(1+ǫ)m¯
(188)
= exp
(
−
[
θ(1 + ǫ)−
eθb − 1
b
]
m¯
)
, (189)
where (184) follows from Markov’s inequality. (186) follows because eθx ≤ 1 + eθb−1
b
x for
x ∈ [0, b], as ex is a convex function in x, (187) follows because 1 + x ≤ ex for all x ≥ 0, and
(188) follows because ∑ni=1 m¯i ≤ m¯.
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The value of θ which maximizes the right hand side of (189) is θ∗ = 1
b
ln(1 + ǫ) > 0, for
which we have
P
(
n∑
i=1
Ui ≥ (1 + ǫ)m¯
)
≤ exp
(
−
m¯
b
[(1 + ǫ) (ln(1 + ǫ)− 1) + 1]
)
. (190)
By considering Taylor’s expansion of x[ln(x)− 1] around x = 1, we have, for all x ≥ 1, that
x[ln(x)− 1] + 1 ≥
1
2
(x− 1)2 −
1
6
(x− 1)3. (191)
We also have, for x ∈ [1, 2], that
1
2
(x− 1)2 −
1
6
(x− 1)3 ≥
1
3
(x− 1)2. (192)
Thus, for all x ∈ [1, 2], we have
x[ln(x)− 1] + 1 ≥
1
3
(x− 1)2. (193)
By applying (193), with x = (1+ ǫ), to the right hand side of (190), we have, for ǫ ∈ [0, 1], that
P
(
n∑
i=1
Ui ≥ (1 + ǫ)m¯
)
≤ exp
(
−
m¯
3b
ǫ2
)
. (194)
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